Firm level data from financial statements for nearly 8,000 listed companies in 22 emerging and 22 developed countries over the period 1994-00 are examined. Capital structure, asset structure, rates of return and financing patterns are compared across countries and over time. Generally, there are as many similarities as differences between the two groups. The differences include lower levels of debt to finance assets and lower levels of current assets in emerging markets compared with developed countries. Returns on assets, expressed in local currency, are comparable in the two groups but appear more volatile in emerging markets.
Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate, to help to establish stylised facts and, where possible, to explain differences between emerging market (EM) corporations and developed market (DM) corporations with respect to accounting ratios, derived from balance sheets and income statements for individual corporations. In addition to the accounting variables such as the structure of corporate liabilities (short-term and long-term), we examine the size distribution of corporations, their capital structures as well as the financing of corporate growth in the two groups of countries. A study of these variables for developing countries is interesting in its own right, but in order to put this into perspective, a comparison with advanced countries is particularly valuable.
The current public interest in corporate finance and corporate behavior in emerging markets is a recent phenomenon that arose out of the East Asian crisis and the view that the 'deeper causes' of the crisis lay in the Asian way of doing business 1 . That view suggested that poor corporate governance, inadequate competition, high leverage and crony capitalism led to disregard for profits, over-investment and exploitation of minority shareholders. Hence, in order to forestall future crises, G-7 countries under the New International Financial Architecture, have proposed, interalia, reform of the corporate system in emerging markets.
2 Whether or not this thesis is correct, corporate reform in emerging markets is now on the national and international agenda. Implementing appropriate reforms, however, requires a body of empirical knowledge that is only now beginning to emerge. This paper attempts to further that knowledge.
Our contribution in this paper relies in reporting on the results of analysis of corporate financial statements of nearly 8,000 companies in 44 countries over the period 1995-00. Although we have a large body of data, it is important to recognize that the sample is not a random selection from each of the countries involved and that, therefore, interpretation of any results must incorporate the nature of the sample and any influence that its selection might have on the results. For that reason, we also draw on what is known about the countries and the sectoral composition of the sample when describing our findings.
At one level, the questions addressed in this paper are simple. For example, how does a typical company in an emerging market finance growth, from internal or external sources? Are firms in emerging markets larger or smaller than their developed market counterparts? Are asset and capital structures in emerging markets fundamentally different from those observed in developed markets? However, interpretation of the empirical answers to these questions is far from being straightforward owing, in part, to the sample issues raised above, as well as the ambiguities that exist in the relevant theoretical models.
The findings are both expected and unexpected. We find that EM firms are generally smaller than their DM counterparts. We also find that EM firms use lower levels of debt currently, but the debt level has declined in recent years from much higher levels previously. We also find that EM firms hold higher levels of fixed assets (relative to total assets) than do DM firms. The evidence also shows that returns on assets and equity have been more volatile for EM than for DM firms and that returns have been generally lower. Finally, the analysis shows that EM firms have used much higher levels of external equity to finance growth than DM firms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section outlines a series of analytical issues that one needs to consider when comparing corporate financial choices and outcomes in an international context. That is followed by a data description and the empirical results. The final section comprises a summary, conclusions and policy implications.
II. Conceptual Issues
Should statistics generated from financial statements about, for example, capital structure and profitability, systematically differ across countries? What does economic theory predict? At one level theory suggests that differences should be immaterial if all countries are subject to the full rigors of competition and market forces. Theory, however, recognises that, despite vigorous market forces, there may be specific factors that result in differences. For example, the sectoral composition of firms might differ across countries and, owing to risks inherent in a sector, this might result in different corporate choices and outcomes. Other factors that influence corporate outcomes are the macroeconomic environment, the regulatory system, institutions (e.g. the legal system and governance) and the preferences of and options available to investors. For these reasons one should not be surprised to find inter-country differences in corporate finance and corporate behavior. In line with this, interpretation of observed behavior therefore requires knowledge of careful attention to these factors.
In the particular case of comparing emerging and developed markets, which is the focus of this paper, there are important environmental differences that are pertinent to the analysis. First, compared with DMs most markets in EMs would be expected to be more imperfect and incomplete, including the product market, the labor market, and particularly the capital market. Second, DM corporations tend to be family owned and there is little separation of ownership and control of the kind found in Anglo-Saxon corporations. Third, domestically-owned business groups and conglomerates dominate corporate structures in many EMs. These conglomerates are quite different in their origin and character than those found in advanced countries and, therefore, their behavior might be different. Fourth, there are differences between EMs and DMs in regulation, in the enforcement of corporate law, in corporate governance and in governance generally.
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In view of these particular features of DMs, it would be difficult to maintain a priori the hypothesis of no difference between the characteristics of the corporations in the two groups of countries. Differences with respect to any particular aspect, such as profitability or the size distribution of firms, would depend on the relative significance of the above factors. We illustrate this by considering the case of financing of corporate growth. Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that even if the managers, acting as agents for owners, are rational shareholder wealth maximizers, because of asymmetric information between them and the investing public, a pecking order of finance (in which internal equity is first choice, followed by debt and then, as a last resort, external equity) would be optimal. This theoretical analysis should be equally applicable in both groups of countries. However, because EM corporations, even large listed ones, are often family controlled and these families are averse to losing control, this may impose an additional reason to avoid external equity finance. One would therefore expect to find in EM corporations even more emphasis on internal equity finance. In addition, subsidised debt from government-controlled lenders might lead to greater use of debt than equity, relegating external equity to a distant third place.
Another conceptual issue regarding differences between the two groups of countries that require attention is that of accounting standards and reporting requirements. In light of recent scandals in the US and other DMs, the superiority of DM accounting is now much less obvious. Moreover, it is important to note that our data for EMs pertains to listed companies where, increasingly, international standards are being applied. Despite that, to the extent that EMs are more inflationary, their accounting data, unless adjusted, could be distorted. For most countries in our sample, however, inflation is not an issue and, where inflation is a problem, adjustments are the norm. 4 Finally, although many of the hypotheses we address are economic in nature and accounting data are not designed to deal directly with those economic issues, we must accept that accounting data are all that are available and adjust our interpretation of the results accordingly. Dealing specifically with issues associated with inter-country accounting differences must be considered beyond the scope of this paper.
III. Data Description
The data consist of various accounts taken from the financial statements of listed companies, as reported by BVD in their May 2002 CD-ROM. BVD attempts to provide data on as many companies as possible for each country, although statistics on coverage (as measured by percentage of each market) are not available. Over time, their sample has grown and this growth has an influence on the data used in this study. The sample period used in much of the work that follows is 1994-2000. Data for earlier years is available for some companies, but the number of companies with data prior to 1994 declines, especially for some of the emerging markets. With that decline, one is usually left with results only for the larger companies in each market, which could bias the results. Data is also available for 2001 for some companies but, owing to a lag in reporting, the number of companies drops by nearly 40 percent from what was reported for 2000. For that reason the sample period is ended at 2000. Table 1 presents the number of companies for each year for each country, with the table divided between developed and emerging markets. 5 In total there are 44 countries represented in the sample: 22 developed markets and 22 emerging markets. For the year 2000, there is a total of 7,968 companies in the sample, which is down 8 percent from what was reported in 1999, most likely reflecting lags in reporting as the number of companies has increased in each year except 2000. Over the duration of the sample period the number of reported companies has increased by 82 percent; the rate of increase in both groups of countries was large, but the increase in the developed markets (84 percent) exceeded the rate of increase in the emerging markets (75 percent).
The number of companies reported in Table 1 is well below the total number of listed companies in these markets, as reported in Standard and Poor's (2001) . For 2000, S&P reports a total of 25,253 listed companies in all emerging markets, compared to a total of only 23,996 for developed markets. Both of these numbers have increased since 1994; the emerging markets universe increased by 76 percent and the developed market total increased by 39 percent. Clearly, the BVD data has far to go before it provides complete coverage of these markets. 2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  AUSTRALIA  84  92  94  80  81  78  72  AUSTRIA  45  49  52  47  41  36  33  BELGIUM  68  72  65  55  43  39  38  BERMUDA  38  42  32  31  28  24  23  CANADA  242  286  274  182  176  151  118  CAYMAN ISLANDS  10  8  10  7  6  6  6  DENMARK  70  78  77  73  68  63  61  FINLAND  66  67  58  40  32  26  26  FRANCE  335  359  308  253  224  196  177  GERMANY  345  382  348  270  242  218  212  GREECE  43  53  55  51  51  37  26  IRELAND  22  24  23  22  20  16  17  ITALY  79  81  65  62  60  47  30  JAPAN  1,163  1,540  1,536  1,323  1,177  413  344  NETHERLANDS  86  95  95  87  78  66  57  NORWAY  35  44  46  40  32  27  24  SINGAPORE  121  149  153  124  91  60  62  SPAIN  47  48  46  30  30  20  18  SWEDEN  105  119  127  106  95  76  60  SWITZERLAND  119  125  124  109  102  88  70  UNITED KINGDOM  460  490  557  545  494  476  425  UNITED STATES  2,572  2,510  2,108  1,902  1,783  1,604  1,443  Group Total  6,155  6,713  6,253  5,439  4,954  3,767  3,342   Emerging Markets  ARGENTINA  21  20  9  7  11  10  9  BRAZIL  117  97  89  57  39  31  CHILE  40  68  69  70  64  56  53  COLOMBIA  50  10  19  41  11  9  8  CZECH  73  63  86  68  39  24  14  HONG KONG  132  157  172  164  153  125  102  HUNGARY  13  17  10  5  5  3  2  INDIA  75  114  176  158  71  48  48  INDONESIA  6  15  27  25  25  26  24  ISRAEL  57  56  39  25  13  11  9  KOREA  779  751  735  705  650  619  533  MALAYSIA  142  207  204  184  205  189  136  MEXICO  40  45  42  31  28  38  31  PAKISTAN  8  11  12  7  5  4  2  PERU  64  68  65  62  3  2  1  P H I L I P P I N E S  8  5  7  4  6  5  5  POLAND  20  29  26  10  5  1  1  SOUTH AFRICA  36  69  73  60  39  17  13  TAIWAN  112  95  92  65  30  20  16  THAILAND  9  19  29  27  28  24  21  T U R K E Y  2  2  6  6  7  7  5  VENEZUELA  9  8  17  3  3  4  3  Group Total  1, Note that the disparity in the number of companies between developed and emerging markets in this sample is also matched by the differences in their market capitalizations. In 1994 total world stock market capitalization was $15.1 trillion, of which EM countries represented just $1.9 trillion, or 13 percent (Standard and Poor's (2002) ). By 2000 the disparity between the two groups of countries had grown even wider, with total market capitalization growing to $32.3 trillion, of which emerging markets represented just $2.7 trillion, or 8 percent. Taking market capitalization as a reference, emerging markets are more than adequately represented in this sample.
Companies were sorted into 8 industrial sectors using NAICS codes as reported by BVD. Those sectors are: chemicals, food and beverages, industrial and consumer products, non-metallic minerals, plastics and rubber, primary metals, pulp and paper, and textiles, apparel and leather. Companies in the financial sector, as well as services and utilities, were excluded from the sample in order to avoid issues related to peculiarities in their reporting and operations relative to manufacturing companies. A summary of the number of companies in each sector in year 2000 is presented in Table 2 . Globally, 55 percent of the sample companies is classified as Industrial and Consumer Products, a sector classification that includes a range of products, including machinery, electronics goods, automobiles and general consumer goods. A distant second in number of companies is chemicals, which accounts for 13 percent of the total. Pulp and paper has the smallest number of companies, 229, representing 3 percent of the global total. The distribution of companies across sectors is roughly comparable in both the developed and emerging markets, although there are less industrial and consumer products companies in emerging markets (43 percent) than in developed markets (58 percent), with the difference spread across a number of sectors. 
IV. Empirical Analysis

A. Size Distribution of Firms
The size of a company, as measured by the total assets on the balance sheet, has potentially important implications. For example, in some sectors size is a determinant of cost structure, as certain technologies require that output be above a minimum threshold in order to be competitive. Even without technological constraints, larger firms may have lower net costs as administrative costs are amortized over larger amounts of output. In either case, one might expect emerging market companies to be at a disadvantage, especially with respect to the larger developed markets where overall demand for products may be higher. Consequently, one might expect to see smaller companies in emerging markets and this might have an impact on their competitiveness.
An alternative view is that size, especially as measured by total assets, is not important. The argument here is that firms exploit two sets of assets in their operations: those that are purchased and reside on their balance sheet; and those that are represented by the human capital that they employ. If human capital is more important in developed than developing countries, then one might expect to see that reflected in the size of companies as measured by total assets.
There is an additional complicating factor, which is the extent to which the firms in any given country are subject to competition. In a large market, such as the US, domestic competition alone might force companies to adopt an optimal technology and that might determine size. The empirical evidence on size in the academic literature is limited. Roberts and Tybout (1991) examine a sample of Chilean and Colombian companies and the impact that trade liberalization had on their size, as measured by number of employees at the plant level. Their review of the theory suggests that the impact of trade openness should be for production rationalization, which suggests increases in size. In fact, they find that plant size is reduced when import competition increases and that the impact increases over time. Note that this effect is measured at the plant and not the company level. Table 3 presents the median value of total assets for each country by year. Starting with the global mean (which is the average of the medians across countries by year), we see that the global median company in 2000 was $189 million, down from $328 million in 1994. This decline likely reflects the expansion in the number of companies in the sample over time. Initially, the largest and most liquid companies were included in the database. Over time, the companies that were added were smaller, pulling down the median value. One can see a similar pattern for the DM sample. For the emerging markets, the pattern over time is more complicated; median company size rises through 1997 and then falls sharply in 1998, with further declines through 2000. A large part of the drop in value in 1998 must reflect the Asia crisis and coincident depreciation of the Asian currencies. As these values are reported in US$ and given the large contingent of Asian companies in the sample, one should expect to see a currency impact at that time. Not all of the impact is from Asia, however; note the decline in the median value for Venezuela in 1998, which has a significant impact on the cross-country mean. Also, note that the median value in Korea changed very little, despite a sharp drop in the value of the Won in 1998.
Ignoring the time series dimension, there are remarkable similarities between the two samples of countries. In the year 2000, for example, the difference in the mean value (of the medians) of the emerging markets sample and the developed markets sample is a mere $24 million, with the DM value larger than the EM value. In fact, the DM median exceeds the EM median in all years, although the difference has declined over time.
Looking deeper at individual countries, one can see that the median size in several EM countries is well in excess of that of the larger DM countries. For example, Mexico, which had 40 companies in the sample in 2000, has a median size of $840 million, nearly four times the US median value and well above that of any DM country. Also note, however, that Peru, which has a sample of 64 companies in 2000, had a median value of only $26 million, far below that of any DM country. Perhaps sector composition accounts for these country differences.
While the median values are useful for summarizing the sample, they also hide much of the variation that occurs across the sample. Some of that variation is revealed in Figure 1 , which presents a histogram of total assets for the year 2000 for both the EM and DM pooled samples. The figure confirms that the EM sample is much like the DM sample, but it does contain more small companies and fewer large companies. More than 35 percent of the EM sample companies have total assets of $50 million or less, compared to a bit more than 25 percent for the DM sample. At the other extreme, only slightly more than 10 percent of the EM sample companies have total assets over $1 billion, compared to about 18 percent for the DM sample. Except for these extremes, the two distributions look remarkably similar. Table 3 provides a simple measure of size -median total assets -but that measure suffers from trying to explain the total distribution of firms in a single statistic. It also combines firms across industries within a single country. Given the potential importance for technology-related industry effects, accounting for industry composition within a country is important.
Size Regressions
This section reports results from a regression of total assets (expressed in natural log form for the year 2000) on a set of industry and country dummies. The results provide industry and country mean values (adjusted for industry effects), as well as a statistical test of differences across industries and countries. Those results are presented in Table 4 . In the table the United States and the Industrial and Consumer Products industries are taken as the base levels against which all other industries and countries are measured. Note that the regression employed a total of 3,360 companies and had an overall R 2 of 21.6 percent. 
DM EM
Starting with the industry coefficients, one sees that 5 of the 7 industries have coefficients that are significantly larger than the base industry; only one industry -textiles -has a lower value. To give an order of magnitude to these coefficients, the mean value of total assets in the base industry/country is $214 million. In the textiles industry that value is reduced to $149 million, about one third less. Non-metallic minerals is the largest industry, with mean value of $505 million.
Within the developed markets 9 of the 22 countries have mean values (after adjusting for industry effects) that differ statistically from the base case. Only two of those, the UK and Bermuda, have a value that is below the base case, with values of $102 million for Bermuda and $123 million for the UK. The other 7 countries have mean values that are above the base case. Japan has the largest companies, with mean value of $3.17 billion after adjusting for industry effects. Note, however, that country size does not correlate well with firm size. Switzerland, which is tiny in GDP terms, has significantly larger companies, on average, to the US base case; the same is true in Ireland. Perhaps this difference reflects the much larger sample from the US, which allows many smaller companies to be included in the sample. -CHILE  190  129  125  125  112  102  85  COLOMBIA  113  202  157  169  361  337  249  CZECH  26  28  43  40  43  47  31  HONG KONG  128  116  111  119  119  110  120  HUNGARY  117  88  104  138  88  60  56  INDIA  168  141  115  119  183  193  285  INDONESIA  322  261  212  231  281  295  224  ISRAEL  109  86  201  218  217  302  431  KOREA  57  51  45  42  61  59  46  MALAYSIA  74  55  50  57  72  67  89  MEXICO  840  650  702  1,157  1,250  659  743  PAKISTAN  30  27  60  56  59  114  124  PERU  26  22  24  30  30  84  148  PHILIPPINES  116  83  239  1,497  65  70  43  POLAND  69  52  51  51  189  75  55  SOUTH AFRICA  113  58  65  104  180  957  1,557  TAIWAN  446  502  422  443  965  569  368  THAILAND  299  172  95  93  183  162  126  TURKEY  156  38  82  67  61  54  134  VENEZUELA  277  326 (1) P-value presents the results of a test for equality of medians across the two country groups. P-values less then 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level.
The emerging markets present a somewhat differ picture, with 11 of 19 emerging markets having coefficients that are statistically different from the base case. Interestingly, five of those countries have mean values that are above the base case. Taiwan has the largest companies (ignoring Venezuela which has a small sample and a single large chemical company), with an average value of $895 million, followed by Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Israel. In addition, 6 countries had smaller companies on average, with the Czech Republic the smallest with mean value of $49 million.
Unfortunately, interpreting the regression results in Table 4 in terms of any of the logical arguments presented above on size determination is difficult as there are many dimensions to be taken into consideration. In Korea, for example, where firms are subjected to fierce domestic competition and export success is important, firms are generally smaller than average. In contrast, in Taiwan, under similarly competitive circumstances, firms are larger than average. In addition to possible competition effects, sample characteristics also need to be taken into consideration. The larger size of Taiwanese firms may reflect the fact that there are far fewer of them in the sample, whereas a large number of Korean companies may reduce their average size. Clearly, interpretation of the results is difficult.
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This regression framework also provides evidence on the relative importance of country and sector effects on company size. To assess these effects, the regression was re-estimated with only country and only industry variables. The results, not reported, show that of the total explained variation in the regression reported in Table 4 , nearly 85 percent of that amount is accounted for by country effects alone. The framework also permits one to examine the extent to which the industry effects are peculiar to either the developed or emerging market companies. Those results, also not reported, show that the industry effects reported in Table 4 do not change when emerging market industry dummy variables are introduced into the regression, nor do the additional variables have significant coefficients, suggesting that industry effects are equal in both size and significance in both sets of countries.
Finally, note that specific firm effects could be an important component of size determination. For example, superior management would result in business success and larger size. Firm-specific effects, however, are absent from our specification owing to the decision to examine the size distribution at a single point in time. 
Evolution of Firm Size over Time
A very important question for economic analysis and public policy is that of the evolution of the size distribution of firms over time and its implications for competition and economic growth. The question of growth becomes relevant since the study of firm size distribution over time essentially involves an analysis of the relationship between size and growth of firms. Is this relationship the same for the two groups of countries?
Economic theory suggests that the simplest hypothesis to start from is the one that regards firm growth to be a random phenomenon across firms.
The specific form of this hypothesis, the so called law of proportionate effects, asserts that all firms have the same chance of growing by a given percentage during any period of time. If this law holds, it has powerful economic implications, including that there will be a relentless increase in industrial concentration over time. 8 An economic rationale for testing this law using an entirely stochastic model of firm growth can be presented in the following terms. It may be argued that firm growth depends on a multitude of factors, some of which make for positive growth, others for negative growth and they are independently randomly distributed. It is difficult to estimate their individual effect, but the combined effect is to generate the stochastic relationship between size and growth of firms as manifest in the law of proportionate effects.
From the perspective of economic analysis, a better theory would be one that postulates that firm growth is subject to both systematic and stochastic forces. The former might be managerial quality or macroeconomic conditions. In empirical terms, the law in this formulation can be tested by a regression of firm closing size on opening size. A regression coefficient of one would indicate the equal growth rates across firms; a coefficient below one suggests convergence in size.
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 5 . The main point that emerges relates to the slope coefficient. In about half the countries in each group the slope coefficient is below one, suggesting that the two groups are not greatly different. However, in about half the countries in each group large firm growth rates exceed or equal those of small firms, suggesting that, other things being equal, industrial concentration in these countries increased over this period.
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B. Capital Structure
Capital structure has important implications for the vulnerability of firms to exogenous shocks. And, as noted earlier, high leverage is thought to have contributed to the East Asian crisis. Despite this importance, there is neither theoretical nor empirical consensus on the factors that drive corporate decisions on this matter. 10 In this section we examine the capital structures of our sample of firms and investigate similarities and differences between the two groups of countries. 
Leverage: Total Liabilities/Total Assets
Globally, the average company in the sample financed just over half of its balance sheet with liabilities, with very little variation in the level of liabilities over time for the global average (Table 6) . That global average, however, masks large variation across individual countries and, within those countries, across time. Across the two major groupings of countries, debt levels were much higher in developed markets, which had a median ratio of total liabilities to total assets ranging from 49 percent (in 2000) to 62 percent (in 1994), with a steady decline following the 1997 Asian crisis. In contrast, the emerging markets group ratio fluctuated between 52 and 53 percent from year to year, with no obvious trend across time. Those differences between countries are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all years.
Even within these two major groupings one observes considerable variation. Some of the lowest levels of debt in the developed markets are observed in the US, where the median company had ratio values of 41 percent in 1996-97. Those ratios increased over the next few years, however, ending the sample period at 45 percent, still well below the level of nearly all other developed markets. Some countries saw debt levels drop over the sample. For example, in Japan the ratio declined from 62 percent in 1994 to 55 percent in 2000, placing it below the developed country median. The ratio for German companies also declined, but ended the period with a median value of 64 percent, well above the group median. In other cases leverage increased, with the median Irish company increasing its leverage ratio from 60 percent in 1994 to 68 percent in 2000, earning it the distinction of having the highest median leverage ratio in the entire developed market sample for that terminal year.
There was also great variation across countries and over time in emerging markets. Indonesia ended the sample period with by far the highest leverage ratio (89 percent), which was up sharply from its levels in the first three years of the sample. Following the 1997 crisis leverage ratios soared in Indonesia as profits turned to losses, thereby eating up equity, with this effect compounded by foreign currency denominated debt being inflated by an especially weak currency and, possibly, by the large decline in the number of Indonesian companies in the sample. Clearly, however, the impact of the crisis was much different in Korea, which also experienced severe currency weakening, but where the leverage ratio was trimmed from a relatively high value of 72 percent in 1994 to a much more conservative 52 percent in 2000. Thailand represents a third way, with lower levels of debt in the early years of the sample, but where the crisis resulted in higher leverage ratios, but not nearly to the extent of Indonesia. Finally, note that leverage ratios declined in Hong Kong following the crisis, but that they increased marginally in Taiwan, one of the few emerging markets in the region that did not experience extreme disruption to its economy at that time.
Some other emerging market countries also produce interesting results. For example, in Venezuela, which had a weak financial sector throughout this sample period, leverage ratios were consistently low, although there was a sharp drop in 1995, likely reflecting the currency devaluation at that time. Also notable is the trend in Brazil, which adopted its real program in 1994 and stabilized inflation, where the level of debt held by the median company climbed steadily from a below average value of 42 percent in 1995 (the first year for which data are available) to an above average value of 62 percent in 2000. Also note the increase in leverage in Pakistan following its 1998 economic hardships (and currency devaluation), as well as the increase in Poland and the Czech Republic over time as the financial systems in those countries developed and came closer to developed country standards. In Turkey one observes relatively high levels of debt despite high inflation and correspondingly high levels of real interest rates. These ratios for Turkey do raise the issue of inflation accounting and the impact that restatement of balance sheets has on ratios such as this.
The use of median values in Table 6 paints a very different picture from what is obtained by using mean values, which suffer from the influence of large outliers. Although mean values of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets are not presented to conserve space, a few comments will highlight their difference with the medians reported in the table.
Globally, mean values of the ratio do not differ significantly, with a global mean of 56 percent, compared to the 52 percent average median value reported in the table. For some countries, however, there are large differences. In Malaysia, for example, the mean value of the ratio for year 2000 is 86 percent, compared to a median value of 48 percent. In many other countries the mean and median do not differ substantially, but in 8 countries the differences are large and always in the direction of lower median ratios than mean ratios. ARGENTINA  41  44  53  46  47  44  46  BRAZIL  62  57  51  52  50  42  CHILE  43  40  42  41  41  40  39  COLOMBIA  34  34  43  30  38  37  33  CZECH REPUBLIC  45  49  47  45  40  41  35  HONG KONG  40  42  44  46  51  52  52  HUNGARY  35  37  30  23  23  29  42  INDIA  47  50  55  56  57  57  60  INDONESIA  89  70  76  71  57  51  54  ISRAEL  40  47  47  56  48  54  54  KOREA  52  56  66  72  71  72  72  MALAYSIA  48  48  50  49  48  51  47  MEXICO  56  49  46  52  50  52  51  PAKISTAN  63  72  59  56  56  68  61  PERU  49  48  48  47  34  28  19  PHILIPPINES  41  22  26  39  17  19  22  POLAND  44  48  43  26  16  15  14  SOUTH AFRICA  51  47  45  46  47  53  57  TAIWAN  47  44  43  44  41  34  36  THAILAND  62  61  54  72  62  56  52  TURKEY  62  68  59  54  63  61  48  VENEZUELA  34  38  33  27  30  31  53  Group Median  49  50  55  58  60  61 (1) P-value reports results for a test of median equality between the two country groups. A value of less than 0,05 rejects equality at the 5 percent level.
Emerging Markets
Differences in medians across the different countries could, in part, represent different industry compositions. To address this issue, Table 7 reports a regression of the year 2000 ratio of total liabilities to total assets on a size factor 11 and a set of sector and country dummy variables, where the base case is taken to be the US Industrial and Consumer Products sector. The table provides limited evidence in favor of sector effects on the ratio; the Chemicals sector has a ratio that is significantly below the level of the other sectors, but no other sector is statistically different from the base sector. Country differences, however, are both large and significant (after controlling for industry effects). Among the developed markets, 17 countries have mean ratios that exceed the level of the US base case. For some of those, for example Ireland (27), Austria (26) and Spain (23), the differences are economically very large. Note that no developed market has a ratio that is statistically below the level of the US. Among the emerging markets, 8 countries have ratios significantly above the level of the US; Indonesia has the largest difference (34), but the sample is small. No emerging market has a ratio that is significantly below the level of the US.
The regression was also estimated for the year 1995 (not reported). The estimated coefficients for that year do not differ notably from those reported in the table. One important difference, however, is in the amount of explained variation (R 2 ). For the year 2000, reported in Table  7 , the regression explains less than 2 percent of the total variation in the data. In contrast, for the year 1995 a similar regression explains 15 percent of the variation. This enormous difference in the two samples is also reflected in the sample statistics for the two periods. The standard deviation of the ratio for the period 2000 was four times the level for the period 1995 globally. Nearly all of the higher level of volatility is in emerging markets; the standard deviation in emerging markets increased by a factor of 8, compared to an increase of 55 percent in the developed markets.
Closer scrutiny explains much of the difference between the 1995 and 2000 samples. Regressions of the two groups of countries reveal that the developed market results do not change much between the two years, whereas the emerging market results differ notably. Breaking the EM sample down further one learns that most of the difference in the two years can be accounted for by a large shift in the distribution of the Korean population over this time period. That shift is documented in Figure 2 . Apparently, Korean companies entered the mid-1990s with high levels of liabilities; for nearly 30 percent of the sample liabilities financed 71-80 percent of total assets. Following the 1998 crisis, however, Korean companies de-levered their balance sheets, with that shift occurring across nearly the entire distribution of Korean companies. That de-leveraging, however, was accompanied by a high level of dispersion in the distribution of leverage ratios, accounting for much of the lower level of explanatory power in the year 2000 regression. 
Current and Non-current Liabilities
Globally, current liabilities represent about 30 percent of total assets, well above the 15 percent of total assets (in 2000) represented by non-current (or long-term) liabilities. Current liabilities represent a combination of both trade and other non-market sources of credit, as well as the current portion of bank lending and bonds. Non-current liabilities represent longterm credit from either banks or markets. Together, these two ratios comprise the total liabilities/ total assets ratio reported in Table 6 . The level of current liabilities is nearly equal in the two major subgroups of countries, with emerging market countries, on average, financing about 30 percent of total assets with current liabilities, as compared to 28 percent in developed markets (in 2000) . There is no apparent trend in the time series behavior of this ratio in the developed markets, however, there appears to be a tendency toward lower levels of current liabilities in the emerging markets over the sample period, falling steadily from 39 percent in 1994 to the current level.
The non-current liabilities ratio, reported in Table 8 , reveal a similar time pattern. The ratio remained steady in the DM countries in the range 15-18 percent, with no obvious time pattern. In the EM countries, however, the ratio started out at a high of 19 percent and then declined following the 1997 crisis to 13 percent. With the exception of the years 1998 and 1994, the ratios in the two groups are statistically different at the 5 percent level. In a regression framework with size, sector and country factors (not reported), however, the EM group average is not statistically different from the DM group average.
Within the two country groups one observes considerable cross-sectional variation, with several countries in both groups producing single digit levels of non-current liabilities, including the most recent year for the UK, a country with a relatively well-developed domestic bond market and with a large number of reporting companies. Even the US, which has arguably the most developed corporate bond market in the world, not to mention a well capitalized and competitive banking sector, has non-current liabilities of only 13 percent in the year 2000, well below, for example, Brazil. 2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  AUSTRALIA  21  23  22  22  20  18  20  AUSTRIA  25  29  33  38  39  40  45  BELGIUM  16  16  18  20  20  22  22  BERMUDA  3  3  6  5  5  7  8  CANADA  19  17  17  18  19  21  22  CAYMAN ISLANDS  16  17  13  12  13  9  9  DENMARK  18  20  17  18  20  19  19  FINLAND  23  24  26  26  23  28 (1) P-value reports the results of test for equality of medians for the two country groups. P-values less than 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level.
Developed Markets
In several other countries in the developed markets sample one sees much higher levels of non-current liabilities, particularly in Germany (31 percent), with its bank-based financial system, in the Nordic countries, and in Austria and Ireland. In emerging markets one finds relatively high levels of non-current liabilities in Mexico (32 percent), where the ratio has remained stable across the sample period, and in Brazil (25 percent), where the ratio increased rapidly following the currency stabilization program introduced in 1994. In Korea, non-current liabilities have actually declined in importance following the 1997 crisis as companies deleveraged themselves; a somewhat similar pattern emerges in Indonesia, albeit with a twist in 2000 as the number of reporting companies dropped sharply.
C. Asset Structure
Asset structure, the relative amounts of fixed and current assets, can provide information on operational efficiency and the choice of technology. However, disentangling these two dimensions is difficult. For example, high levels of current assets may suggest over-investment in inventory. Alternatively, as explained more fully below, the combination of lower levels of fixed assets combined with high levels of human capital, which do not appear on the balance sheet, can produce the same result. In this section we document the relative amounts of current and fixed assets used in our sample groups of countries.
Current and Fixed Assets/Total Assets
Current assets, which consist primarily of cash, liquid securities, inventory and trade receivables, comprise roughly half of all assets on a global basis, and this level of current assets has been maintained consistently across the sample period. There is, however, considerable variation across the countries, with the developed market countries holding, on average, about 57 percent of their assets in this form, as opposed to a much lower level of 41 percent (in 2000) for the emerging markets.
As the complement to current assets, fixed assets (Table 9 ) also represent about half of the total. Here again, one sees the marked difference in the levels of the ratio in the two groups of countries, with emerging market countries holding much higher levels of fixed assets than their developed market counterparts. This difference is highlighted by the remarkably low levels of fixed assets in two leading developed markets -the US and Germany -both of which had ratios below both the global and developed market average. The difference extends much deeper, however, as only four of the developed markets had fixed asset ratios in excess of 50 percent (Australia, Canada, Cayman Islands and Ireland), with only three of the emerging markets having ratios below 50 percent.
Differences between the countries might reflect sector effects, but regressions (not reported) that control for sector effects do not support that view. For the year 2000, a regression of the ratio of fixed assets to total assets on country and industry variables shows that although sector effects are statistically significant, country effects are also significant. Specifically, among the emerging market countries, 8 countries had ratios that were statistically larger than the US, and only a single emerging market country -Turkey -had a ratio that was below the US. Among developed markets, 2 countries had ratios above the US and 5 had ratios below the US. Apparently, even controlling for sector effects the EM group held higher levels of fixed assets than the DM group and that difference was statistically significant.
This result is at odds with one view of the world that posits higher levels of current assets in emerging markets as a result of poorer inventory management skills, combined with a need for precautionary balances of both cash and inventory. The result could be consistent with a view that the reporting companies in the developed markets are more mature and that, therefore, their fixed assets are more fully depreciated, leaving them primarily with current assets on the balance sheet. But that view fails to account for the fact that most companies are constantly investing and that depreciation actually does represent the consumption of capital over time, thereby requiring the acquisition of new and undepreciated equipment. What may be observed instead is a world in which highly skilled and highly paid labor in developed markets is acting as an additional form of capital, but one not counted on the balance sheet. In contrast, the low wage unskilled worker in the emerging markets must be combined with higher levels of fixed assets. (1) P-vale reports the results of test for equality of medians between the two countries. P-values less than 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level.
D. Return on Assets and Equity
Return on assets is of central importance in a market economy. Allocation of capital on the basis of risk and return is the basis for financial economics and has obvious policy implications. In this section we examine the differences between the returns of the various countries and sectors in our sample.
Ignoring potential impacts from various accounting standards on income calculation, note that a major difference across countries in calculating returns is the impact of local inflation. For that reason, the return statistics reported in both Tables 10 and 11 have been adjusted for the difference between the local rate of inflation and the US rate of inflation for the corresponding year, so that all returns are reported in US nominal terms. This adjustment does not account for currency movements, which could also be significant, because the reported returns are accounting returns, not market returns. Adjusting for the impact of currency movements on accounting returns is delicate and no obvious methodology is available.
For that reason we rely on a simple inflation differential adjustment.
The global median return on assets (inflation adjusted) has ranged from 1.8 percent to 4.2 percent over the sample period (Table 10) , with the high in 1996 and the low in 1998. The difference between the developed and emerging market median values is significantly different in all years except 1999, when they are equal. In all years except 1999 the EM returns are below the DM returns. Notably, returns in EM countries are near zero over 1994-97, with a sharp drop in 1998 as the Asia crisis both reduced nominal returns and increased inflation in several EM countries. Both the inflation and nominal return effects were transitory however, and EM returns increased in 1999-00.
The variation across individual countries is more substantial. Note, in particular, the higher incidence of negative values in the emerging market sample, but also bear in mind that many of these countries have relatively small numbers of companies which should result in higher volatility in the median over time. In a few countries one observes relatively low volatility -Australia, Denmark, France, Japan and Taiwan are exampleswhereas in other countries higher volatility prevails -Italy and Mexico are examples. Cyclical patterns are discernible; a slowdown in the returns provided by US companies is evident in 1998-00 after three years of higher returns. In Malaysia one sees high returns through 1997, with lower returns in subsequent years, but a similar pattern is not obvious in either Thailand or Korea, both countries that fell prey to the Asia crisis of 1997.
Differences at the country group level are also evident at the sector level, as reported in Figure 3 , which shows the (inflation-adjusted) returns on assets for year 2000 for each of the 8 sectors for the two country groups. Returns in the DM sectors are consistently in the 4-5 percent range, with the notable exception of textiles, which returned just over 1 percent.
There is considerably more variation in EM returns, although within the same range as the DM group. In part because of the lower number of firms in the individual sectors, the differences between the two country groups are statistically significant only for Food, Nonmetallic Minerals and Metals, and in each of those cases the EM median is below that of the DM group. EM group median returns exceed the DM group's returns in four sectors, but those differences are not statistically significant.
The median returns on equity (Table 11 , inflation adjusted) reflect both changes in income over time as well as time variation in capital structure. Globally, returns peaked in 1995, dipped in 1998 and then recovered over 1999-00. Differences between the two country groups are significant, both statistically (in all years) and economically. Returns in DM countries were high over 1994-97 approaching 10 percent in each year, compared to only about 6 percent in EM countries for the first three years falling to 3 percent in 1997. The Asian crisis hit returns hard in the EM group in 1998, pushing them below zero, but recovery was both rapid and strong, with EM returns well above their DM counterparts in 1999. A few countries have returns that exhibit low volatility over timeAustralia and Singapore are examples -but many countries show Returns on both assets and equity have significant size, country and sector effects, but there is no difference, on average, between the (inflation-adjusted) returns (in 2000) in the two country groups after controlling for these factors. In regressions, not reported, a large number of countries had country fixed effects that were significantly greater than the returns on the base country (the US). Several sectors had significant fixed effects, relative to the base sector (industrial and consumer products), but those effects were all negative. There was also a significant and positive size effect on returns. None of these factors account for much of the variation in returns across firms, however, as the R2 of the regressions (for returns on assets) was a mere 1.1 percent, of which country factors account for the largest part by far.
E. Financing Growth
As companies grow their balance sheets through the acquisition of assets, they have choices to make in how that growth is financed. Previous period earnings can be retained as a source of internal equity finance or paid to shareholders in the form of dividends. External sources of finance include both the issuance of new shares -external equity -and the issuance of various debt instruments -liabilities. The final choice between these various financing options will reflect the many factors discussed in Section II above. Using the growth in the balance sheet over the period 1995-00 as the sample period, the financing of the growth in total assets is divided into these three components and expressed as a percentage of the change in total assets for the period. The means of these three ratios, which sum to 100 percent for each country, the two country groups and the overall sample, are presented in Table 12 . (1) P-vale reports the results of test for equality of medians between the two countries. P-values less than 0.05 reject equality at the 5 percent level.
Globally, liabilities accounted for 49 percent of total financing over the 5-year period, which corresponds closely with the overall median value of total liabilities/total assets reported in Table 5 for each of the individual years. Table 11 also tells us that, of the remaining 51 percent, internal equity sources represented 29 percent, with external equity equal to 22 percent of the total.
What is striking about Table 12 is the substantial difference in the patterns across the two groups of countries and across individual countries. First, the use of liabilities to finance growth is much lower in the emerging markets, with that lower level offset by higher levels of both internal and external equity. Note in particular that the use of external equity in emerging markets is well above the levels of the developed markets, which agrees with the findings of Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001) on the level of development of primary equity markets. Second, in some of the emerging markets the use of liabilities is extremely low. In Korea, for example, few liabilities were used and growth was financed largely from external equity. Korea is also a country where the leverage ratios declined notably over the period 1994-00. Third, in other countries the impact of the crisis makes the statistics more difficult to interpret. In Indonesia there are only 6 companies in the sample and the average growth in total assets was limited owing to the poor economic environment. In addition, neither internal nor external equity were significant sources of finance. Moreover, foreign currency denominated liabilities increased significantly in value over the period as the exchange rate depreciated. Hence, liabilities were the dominant source of finance for Indonesian companies over the period.
Within the developed markets there was much lower variation across countries in the use of external liabilities, with the US having the lowest propensity (after Bermuda) for liabilities (47 percent), which corresponds with its low level of liabilities on its balance sheet. Other countries employed much higher levels of liability financing. Ireland had the highest level among the group (76 percent, ignoring the Cayman Islands), followed by Denmark (72 percent), Italy and Spain (68 percent each).
There was also great variation across countries in both groups in the use of external equity. One country in the sample actually decreased the amount of external equity employed, but that country, Spain, had a small number of companies in the sample and one of those was an outlier with a small decrease in the value of total assets, which then translates a positive change in external equity into a negative ratio. Deleting that outlier produces an external finance ratio of 3 percent. The largest user of external equity was an emerging market country -Korea -where nearly half of all growth was financed from that source over the period. In contrast, external equity financed 21 percent of growth in the US, the world's largest and most developed equity market, a level comparable to that of the Emerging Market average and below that of 5 Emerging Market countries for this period. 1%  71%  FINLAND  53%  26%  22% INDIA  53%  5%  43%  FRANCE  61%  7%  31% INDONESIA  110%  12% -23%  GERMANY  62%  5%  33% ISRAEL  54%  6%  40%  GREECE  52%  34%  14% KOREA  27%  48%  25%  IRELAND  76%  5%  18% MALAYSIA  40%  18%  42%  ITALY  68%  5%  27% MEXICO  61%  30%  10%  JAPAN  62%  6%  32% PHILIPPINES  34%  17%  49%  NETHERLANDS  65%  9%  26% SOUTH AFRICA  49%  10%  41%  NORWAY  50%  23%  27% TAIWAN  59%  40%  1%  SINGAPORE  66%  15%  19% THAILAND  74%  11%  15%  SPAIN  68%  -9%  40% 1 TURKEY  61%  18%  21%  SWEDEN  57%  4%  39% VENEZUELA  27%  54%  19%  SWITZERLAND  54%  7%  39%  UNITED 1. Spain has 18 companies, one of which experienced a small decline in total assets over 1995-00. That company also saw external equity increase, which resulted in a large negative value for the external equity ratio. Excluding that one company, the sample mean of the ratio is 3%; the internal equity ratio would decline accordingly.
One point to bear in mind when interpreting these financing ratios is the relative amounts of capital being raised from the various sources. Over the sample period the rate of growth, measured in Dollar terms, was actually lower in the EM group than the DM group. The average of the country growth rates was 18 percent in the EM group, compared to 28 percent for the DM group. Hence, the EM group had less growth to finance, which might help to account for their ability to finance more of that growth in the equity markets.
V. Conclusions
The main empirical results of the paper may be summarised as follows:
1. regarding size as measured by total assets, there is no significant difference in the distribution of EM and DM firms in our sample; country effects explain more of the inter-firm variation in the distribution of size than do sector effects; and over the sample period the relationship between size and firm growth was broadly the same in the two groups of countries. 2. regarding firm leverage, EM firms have lower levels of leverage than do DM firms; the use of current liabilities is much the same in the two groups of countries; current liabilities finance a larger portion of total assets than do long-term liabilities in both groups of countries; and neither country nor sector factors explain much of the inter-firm variation in leverage. 3. regarding asset structure, the EM firms employ a higher level of fixed assets than do their DM counterparts. 4. regarding returns on assets and equity, returns are similar across the two groups of countries, although there appears to be more volatility of returns for EM firms. 5. regarding the financing of growth, EM firms' use of external equity finance is higher than that of DM firms; the latter use higher levels of liabilities; and the use of internal finance is similar between the two groups of countries. 6. country effects account for more of the variation in all variables than do either sector or size effects, but individual firm effects account for most of the variation.
Although these results may be regarded as sample specific, they nevertheless raise certain broad issues that merit policy discussion. First, one finding that stands out above all others is the importance of the stock market in financing the growth of EM firms. This suggests that stock market development in these countries has been important. However, whether further development of the stock market should take place and the form that it takes may depend on the particular circumstances of each country and should be the subject of serious policy discussion. Second, the finding that EM firms use lower levels of liabilities to finance their balance sheets suggests that policy makers may need to spend more time on the development of credit markets. However, it could also mean that policies that reduce the riskiness of the environment within which EM firms operate could accomplish the same goal. Third, we find that, contrary to a priori expectations, there are far fewer differences between the EM and DM firms than one would expect. Consequently, the view that EM firms are less subject to competition and market forces may not be valid. Indeed, our own research, Glen , indicates that the intensity of competition in some EM countries is at levels similar to those found in DM countries. In order to maintain a competitive environment, policy makers will need to concentrate not only on capital structure and corporate finance issues, but also on competition in product markets.
Notes
1
See, for example, Pomerleano (1999) , Greenspan (1998) and Summers (1998) . For critical views of this hypothesis see Singh (2000) and Stiglitz (2000) .
2
For fuller discussion of these issues see Singh, Singh and Weiss (2002) .
3 Laffont (1999) suggests product market competition in emerging markets to be highly imperfect. For a different perspective, see Singh (2001, 2002) . For a review of these issues see Tybout (2000) . On capital market imperfections in general in emerging markets, see Singh (1997) . On groups and conglomerates see Leff (1977) , Singh (1995) and Khanna (2000) . On implications of regulatory and legal inadequacies in emerging markets see Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) . On ownership patterns see Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) . 4 Inflation accounting in some EMs is well developed. For example, Whittington et al (1997) show that the Brazilian method of inflation adjustment deals effectively with the problem.
5
The division into developed and emerging markets is based on the system employed by Standard and Poor's (2000) , which follows the system originally developed by IFC in its Emerging Markets Database.
6
The sample used in this and the following regressions differs slightly from the sample used in the other tables. There are two dimensions to this difference. First, the main objective was to produce data for the financing regressions reported later, which require data for both years, 1995 and 2000; this eliminates 3,863 companies that did not have data for both years. Second, to avoid the impact of a few outliers on the results, the sample excludes 749 companies (18 percent of the sample) where the ratio of financing from any source to total assets exceeds 200 percent.
7 Roberts et al (2002) argue that competition in Taiwan and Korea is different and that Taiwan is more competitive.
8
See Caves (1998) for a recent review article on the law of proportionate effects and modern theory about size distribution. The other things equal clause is important here since entry and exit patterns could, in principle, reverse the growth of industrial concentration. These phenomena have not been examined here.
10 Myers (2001) reviews the literature on capital structure.
11 The size factor is 1n (company total assets/global mean total assets).
12 As mentioned in an earlier note, the sample used in this analysis is smaller than the sample used in most of the other tables. In particular, note that the largest outliers (as measured by the size of their financing ratios) have been eliminated, which permits one to use mean values, rather than medians, making a comparison across ratios and countries easier.
